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THE UNMERRY WIDOW: SPOUSAL
DISINHERITANCE AND LIFE INSURANCE
IN NORTH CAROLINA*
JEFFREY S. KINSLER**
In spite of our nation's long-held public policy of protecting
surviving spouses, some people purposely disinherit their
spouses. For centuries, North Carolina more or less tolerated
intentional spousal disinheritance. In 1959, in an effort to protect
surviving spouses from deliberate disinheritance, North Carolina
adopted a "right of dissent" statute that authorized a surviving
spouse to renounce the decedent spouse's will and receive a
statutorily prescribed share (ranging from one-sixth to one-half)
of the decedent spouse's probate estate. Because the dissent
statute was limited to the decedent spouse's probate estate, it was
easily circumvented through the use of non-probate transfers. In
1969, the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") proposed legislation
designed to close the non-probate loophole by expanding the
scope of the elective share to an "augmented estate" comprised of
the decedent spouse's probate estate and most non-probate
transfers made by the decedent spouse during life. In 1990, the
UPC added life insurance proceeds payable to persons other than
the surviving spouse to the augmented estate. In 2001, the North
Carolina General Assembly adopted a version of the UPC's
augmented estate. Prior to the effective date, however, the
General Assembly made an ostensibly technical revision to its
new elective share law. Although minor in appearance, the goal
of the revision was major: the removal of life insurance proceeds
payable to non-spousal beneficiaries from the scope of the
elective share. The revision was likely completed due to lobbying
by insurance companies, which have traditionally resisted elective
share laws in other states. Despite the General Assembly's efforts
to protect insurance companies, most life insurance proceeds
payable to non-spousal beneficiaries are still included in the
surviving spouse's elective share. While this inclusion promotes
North Carolina's interest in protecting surviving spouses from
* Copyright © 2009 by Jeffrey S. Kinsler.
** Professor of Law and Senior Scholar, Elon University School of Law. The title of
this Article is derived from "The Merry Widow," an operetta by the Austro-Hungarian
composer Franz Lehar that was first performed in 1905.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
total disinheritance, the State does not need to choose between
protecting insurance companies and protecting surviving spouses.
This Article proposes legislation that would allow the State to
further its policy of protecting surviving spouses while
simultaneously protecting insurance companies from additional
liability.
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INTRODUCTION
This nation has a long-held policy of protecting the financial
security of surviving spouses.' The traditional justification for this
policy was to provide adequate support for the surviving spouse who
might otherwise become a ward of the state.2 In recent years, a
second justification has emerged: marriage is an economic
partnership in which each spouse contributes to the marital assets,
and each deserves a portion thereof.3
In spite of such policy, some people purposely disinherit their
spouses,4 and those inclined to do so will exploit any loophole to
realize their objective.' For this reason, nearly all separate property
states have adopted elective share laws designed to prevent
intentional spousal disinheritance,6 but the efficacy of such laws is
1. See, e.g., In re Estate of McGee, 988 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(noting the "strong public policy" of protecting the surviving spouse (citing Via v. Putnam,
656 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 1995))); Shimp v. Huff, 556 A.2d 252, 263 (Md. 1989)
(highlighting the "strong public policy" of protecting surviving spouses); Wasserman v.
Schwartz, 836 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (explaining that "public
policy" underlies protection of surviving spouses).
2. See Alan Newman, Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, 43
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 523, 549 (2008) (discussing two policies of the elective share
statutes as the partnership theory of marriage and supporting the surviving spouse); Colby
T. Roe, Comment, Arkansas Marriage: A Partnership Between a Husband and Wife, or a
Safety Net for Support?, 61 ARK. L. REV. 735, 736 (2009) ("These are the two contrasting
views of elective share: the support theory versus the economic-partnership theory.").
3. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 2, at 549; Roe, supra note 2, at 736.
4. See, e.g., Traub v. Zlatkiss, 559 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that a transfer of assets to reduce the widow's inheritance could not be set aside); Newman
v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. 1937) (finding that the trust agreements served the
function of "evading and circumventing the laws"); In re Estate of Francis, 327 N.C. 101,
104, 394 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1990) (finding that deposits in joint bank accounts should not be
included in the net estate of the decedent); Moore v. James, 44 N.C. App. 578, 580, 261
S.E.2d 289, 290 (1980) (holding that trust assets were to be included in the estate's net
assets); Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 893 (R.I. 2006) (concluding that a conveyance of
real estate prior to death extinguishes a surviving spouse's right to a life estate).
5. See infra Part I. Indeed, there are estate planners who cater to clients who desire
to disinherit their spouses. See generally Ronald Z. Domsky, 'Til Death do Us Part ...
After that My Dear, You're on Your Own: A Practitioner's Guide to Disinheriting a Spouse
in Illinois, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 207 (2005) (offering practical advice to estate practitioners in
Illinois on how to help a client intentionally disinherit a spouse or family member).
6. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 425 n.1 (7th ed.
2005). All separate property states except Georgia have elective share laws. See id.
Elective share statutes are unnecessary in community property states because marital
assets are equalized during life. See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 306 (1987)
(explaining that elective share statutes exist only in separate property states as a
replacement for the spousal protection acquired during marriage in community property
states).
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contingent on the closure of all loopholes.7 An elective share statute
with a single loophole is the equivalent of no statute at all, for in both
instances a person predisposed to disinherit his or her spouse may do
so with impunity.
For centuries, North Carolina-like most separate property
states-more or less tolerated intentional spousal disinheritance. In
1959, North Carolina, in an effort to protect surviving spouses from
deliberate disinheritance, adopted a "right of dissent" statute that
authorized a surviving spouse to renounce the decedent spouse's will
and in lieu thereof elect to receive a statutorily prescribed share
(ranging from one-sixth to one-half) of the decedent spouse's
"probate" estate.8 Because the dissent statute was limited to the
decedent spouse's probate estate, it was easily circumvented through
the use of non-probate transfers, such as inter vivos trusts, joint
tenancies, payable-on-death contracts, and life insurance.9  As a
result, the right of dissent statute did very little to prevent intentional
spousal disinheritance.
In 1969, the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") proposed
legislation designed to close the non-probate loophole by expanding
the scope of the elective share to an "augmented estate" comprised of
the decedent spouse's probate estate and most non-probate transfers
made by the decedent spouse during life.1" In 1990, the UPC added
life insurance proceeds payable to persons other than the surviving
spouse to the augmented estate.1 The objective of the augmented
7. See generally G. Michael Bridge, Note, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-202: A
Proposal to Include Life Insurance Assets within the Augmented Estate, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 511 (1989) (arguing for closure of the life insurance loophole in the 1969 Uniform
Probate Code). This Article proceeds on the assumption that all purposeful disinheritance
should be opposed. Though this assumption is the subject of debate, that debate is the
subject for another article.
8. An Act to Rewrite the Statutes on Dissent from Wills, ch. 880, 1959 N.C. Sess.
Laws 896 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1999) (repealed 2000)); Phillips v. Phillips,
296 N.C. 590, 605, 252 S.E.2d 761, 770 (1979) (noting that that the purpose of the dissent
statute was to protect surviving spouses).
9. See, e.g., Phillips, 296 N.C. at 605-06, 252 S.E.2d at 771 ("[T]he statute fails to
foreclose the possibility of intentional disinheritance. A surviving spouse's elective share
under G.S. 30-3 [was] based on a percentage of the decedent's 'net estate.' Because the net
estate includes only probate assets, [a testator could effectively disinherit] his spouse by
leaving his property to others through the use of will substitutes.").
10. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1969).
11. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205 (1990). Life insurance payable to the surviving
spouse was included in the augmented estate under the 1969 version of the UPC. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1969); see also Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership
Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation System of the Uniform
Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487, 497
n.41 (2000) (calling on states to adopt a "deferred community property" system as an
1872 [Vol. 87
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estate is to prevent deliberate spousal disinheritance,12 and it has
functioned quite well in those jurisdictions implementing the UPC's
approach.13
Effective January 1, 2001, the North Carolina General Assembly
adopted a version of the UPC's augmented estate.14 Prior to the
effective date, however, the General Assembly made an ostensibly
technical revision to its new elective share law. 5 Although minor in
appearance, the goal of the revision was major: the removal of life
insurance proceeds payable to non-spousal beneficiaries from the
scope of the elective share. 6 The revision was likely completed due
to lobbying by insurance companies, which have traditionally resisted
elective share laws in other states." Until now, legal commentators
have assumed that the General Assembly successfully removed life
insurance proceeds from North Carolina's elective share statute.1
8
This Article will demonstrate, however, that the General Assembly
probably failed to achieve its goal as the statute includes life
alternative to traditional elective share laws); Daniel E. Martin, Comment, Comparative
Analysis Between the Uniform Probate Code and Michigan Elective Share Systems: The
Time Is Ripe to Adopt the Augmented Estate Concept in Michigan, 69 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 381, 394 (1992) (comparing the UPC and Michigan law with regard to protection of
surviving spouses and encouraging Michigan to adopt the UPC).
12. See, e.g., In re Estate of Zimmerman, 2001 N.D. 155, 12, 633 N.W.2d 594, 598
("The purpose of the concept of augmenting the probate estate in computing the elective
share is ... to prevent the owner of wealth from making arrangements which transmit his
property to others by means other than probate deliberately to defeat the right of the
surviving spouse to a share." (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 cmt. (2000))).
13. See In re Ridgeway, 877 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining that life
insurance premiums paid to a spouse are included in the augmented estate); Felix-
Aranibar v. Felix, No. W26889, 2002 WL 1941025, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2002)
(holding that life insurance benefits are included in Virginia's augmented estate for the
purpose of the surviving spouse's elective share); see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital
Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 61 n.99 (1994) (noting that UPC § 2-205
includes life insurance premiums in the elective share).
14. Act to Modify the Rights of a Decedent's Spouse, ch. 30, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws
1174 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 (2007), amended by An Act to Revise the
Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS
2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1)); see also Tracy
Dawn Cobb, Comment, North Carolina's New Elective Share Statute: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 795, 810 (2001) (noting that North Carolina adopted
a variation of the UPC's augmented estate concept).
15. Act to Modify the Rights of a Decedent's Spouse, at 1174 (indicating that the
General Assembly deleted section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code from the definition
of the decedent spouse's total net assets).
16. See Cobb, supra note 14, at 817-18 (explaining that the General Assembly deleted
section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code from the total net assets with the intent to
remove life insurance proceeds from inclusion).
17. See infra Part II.
18. Cobb, supra note 14, at 818-19.
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insurance policies in the elective share. Despite the General
Assembly's efforts to protect insurance companies, most life
insurance proceeds payable to non-spousal beneficiaries are still
included in the surviving spouse's elective share. 9  While this
inclusion promotes North Carolina's interest in protecting surviving
spouses from total disinheritance, the State does not need to choose
between protecting insurance companies and protecting surviving
spouses. This Article proposes legislation that would allow the State
to further its policy of protecting surviving spouses while
simultaneously protecting insurance companies from additional
liability.
History proves that a person predisposed to disinherit his or her
spouse will exploit even the smallest of loopholes.2" Although the
General Assembly failed in its effort to create a major life insurance
loophole in North Carolina's elective share statute, a minor life
insurance loophole still exists, as illustrated by the following
hypothetical.
Mr. Testator is a North Carolina resident with $1 million of
liquid assets. At death, Mr. Testator wants his property distributed as
follows: 100% to his sister, Sally, and 0% to his surviving spouse,
Wilma. If Mr. Testator attempts such distribution by will, inter vivos
trust, joint tenancy, joint bank account, or payable-on-death account,
Wilma will be entitled to a portion (probably one-half) of such assets
under North Carolina's elective share law.2 There is, however, one
type of transfer-life insurance-that will allow Mr. Testator to leave
his entire estate to Sally and nothing to Wilma. Mr. Testator could
transfer $1 million to the trustee of an irrevocable life insurance trust
("ILIT") with Sally as the beneficiary. The trustee of the ILIT could
then use the $1 million to purchase a single-premium insurance policy
on Testator's life, designating the ILIT as the beneficiary. When Mr.
Testator dies, the life insurance proceeds will be paid to the ILIT for
the benefit of Sally, and under existing North Carolina law, these
assets would be exempt from Wilma's elective share rights.22 For all
19. See infra Part III.B.
20. See, e.g., Traub v. Zlatkiss, 559 So. 2d 443,447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Newman
v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. 1937); Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 898 (R.I. 2006).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 (2007), amended by An Act to Revise the Existing
Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS 2009-368
(2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1).
22. See infra Part III.B.
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practical purposes, therefore, spouses may still intentionally disinherit
each other in North Carolina.23
Part I of this Article examines the history of dower, curtesy,
dissent, and elective share in North Carolina and under the UPC,
which has greatly influenced recent legislation in North Carolina.24
Part II refutes the purported justifications for treating life insurance
differently than other non-probate transfers. Part III analyzes the
General Assembly's unsuccessful attempt to create a major life
insurance loophole in North Carolina's elective share law. In
addition, this Part identifies and dissects the minor life insurance
loophole that still exists in the elective share statute. Finally, Part IV
proposes legislation designed to remedy the existing life insurance
loophole in a manner that protects both surviving spouses and life
insurance companies.
I. SPOUSAL PROTECTION IN NORTH CAROLINA
If all spousal disinheritance were the result of inadvertence,
statutory protection would be unnecessary or, at least, simplistic.2
The case law, though, is replete with examples of people who
attempt-often successfully-to deliberately disinherit their
spouses.26 While the case law in North Carolina includes no examples
23. In addition to an elective share, a surviving spouse is entitled "to an allowance of
the value of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) for the surviving spouse's support for one
year after the death of the deceased spouse." An Act to Increase the Amount of the
Year's Allowance for a Surviving Spouse and to Make Conforming Changes to Related
Provisions, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 183, available at NC LEGIS 2009-183 (2009)
(Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-15). The "year's allowance" is to be
paid out of personal property in the decedent spouse's probate estate. Id. It may not be
paid out of life insurance proceeds. See In re Brown's Estate, 40 N.C. App. 61, 63, 251
S.E.2d 905, 906 (1979) (finding that proceeds from an insurance policy are not included in
personal property). North Carolina also has a $1,000 homestead exemption. N.C. CONST.
art. X, § 2.
24. For example, in 2007, North Carolina adopted UPC sections 2-510 (Incorporation
by Reference), 2-511 (Testamentary Additions to Trusts), and 2-512 (Events of
Independent Significance). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-47, 31-51, 31-52 (2007).
25. Spouses who are disinherited by premarital wills are known as omitted or
pretermitted spouses. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 cmt. (1990). Under the
UPC, such inadvertently omitted spouses are generally entitled to an intestate share. Id.
North Carolina treats pretermitted spouses the same as spouses who were purposely
disinherited. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.3 (2007) ("A will is not revoked by a subsequent
marriage of the maker; and the surviving spouse may petition for an elective share when
there is a will made prior to the marriage in the same manner, upon the same conditions,
and to the same extent, as a surviving spouse may petition for an elective share when there
is a will made subsequent to marriage.").
26. See, e.g., Traub v. Zlatkiss, 559 So. 2d 443,447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Newman
v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 967 (N.Y. 1937); Estate of Francis, 327 N.C. 101, 104, 394 S.E.2d
2009] 1875
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of deliberate disinheritance of spouses, statutes that allow such
behavior will inevitably result in such cases. Other states, for
example, have experienced such disinheritance. An egregious
example is Newman v. Dore,27 in which Ferdinand Straus, an eccentric
octogenarian, died on June 28, 1934, survived by his thirty-year-old
estranged wife.28  The applicable New York elective share statute
encompassed only probate assets;29 it did not include non-probate
transfers made by the decedent spouse before death.30  Fully
cognizant of the law, Mr. Straus, three days before his death,
transferred all of his real and personal property into inter vivos trusts,
thereby completely depleting his probate estate.3' Mr. Straus's
surviving spouse was not a beneficiary of the trusts.2 As a result, her
elective share was limited to one-third of Mr. Straus's probate
estate-that is, one third of nothing.33  The New York Court of
Appeals ultimately invalidated Mr. Straus's inter vivos trusts,34 but a
clearer example of (attempted) malicious disinheritance is hard to
imagine.
Malicious disinheritance is not limited to early twentieth century
case law. A modern example of deliberate disinheritance is Traub v.
Zlatkiss,3 6 where a few days before death, Sheldon Traub, a wealthy
150, 152 (1990); Moore v. James, 44 N.C. App. 578, 580, 261 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1980);
Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 898 (R.I. 2006).
27. 9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1937).
28. Id. at 967; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 444 n.12 (describing the
facts of Newman v. Dore).
29. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 18-20 (Gould 1929). The statute reads:
[A] personal right of election is given to the surviving spouse to take his or her
share of the estate as in intestacy, subject to the limitations, conditions and
exceptions contained in this section .... These limitations and exceptions include
a case where "the testator has devised or bequeathed in trust an amount equal to
or greater than the intestate share, with income thereof payable to the surviving
spouse for life." Subdivision 1(b). The Legislature has declared that its intention
in enacting these sections of the revised Decedent Estate Law was "to increase the
share of a surviving spouse in the estate of a deceased spouse, either in a case of
intestacy or by an election against the terms of the will of the deceased spouse thus
enlarging property rights of such surviving spouse."
Id.
30. Newman, 9 N.E. 2d at 967.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. ("If the [trust] agreements effectively divested the settlor of title to his
property, then the decedent left no estate and the widow takes nothing.").
34. Id. at 969-70.
35. See id. at 967 (noting the trial court's finding that Ferdinand Straus created the
trust agreements for the purpose of "evading and circumventing the laws").
36. 559 So. 2d 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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businessman who was separated from his second wife, conveyed his
real estate, securities, and bank accounts to his friends and children
from a former marriage.37 Like New York law, Florida's elective
share statute applied only to probate assets.3" Thus, Mr. Traub's
lifetime transfers substantially depleted his probate estate and
consequently disinherited his surviving spouse.39  Mrs. Traub
challenged the validity of her husband's lifetime transfers, but the
Florida court-unlike the court in Newman-upheld them.4"
Newman and Traub exemplify the need for comprehensive
legislation to protect surviving spouses from deliberate
disinheritance.41 To better understand the need for such legislation, it
is important to analyze the history of spousal protection in North
Carolina and under the UPC because, as Justice Holmes famously
observed, "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience."42
A. Prior to 1784: Common Law Dower and Curtesy
Prior to 1784, North Carolina's sole protection for surviving
spouses was common law dower,43 which gave a surviving wife a one-
third interest for life in most real estate owned by her husband during
the marriage." The wife's dower interest attached at the time the
37. Id. at 444.
38. Id. at 445 (noting that section 732.206 of the Florida Statutes provided that the
surviving spouse's elective share of the decedent's estate was calculated by reference to all
of the property of the decedent subject to probate administration).
39. Id. at 444-45.
40. Id. at 446 ("Completed inter vivos transfers of assets by a spouse which reduce the
transferring spouse's probate estate, even if made with the specific intent to diminish or
eliminate a surviving spouse's statutory elective share, do not constitute a legal 'fraud' on
the surviving spouse and are not subject to being set aside in whole or in part at the behest
of the surviving spouse in order to increase the surviving widow's elective share.").
41. See also In re Estate of Froman, 803 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(invalidating large cash gift made by decedent spouse one year before death); Pezza v.
Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 350 (R.I. 1997) (upholding decedent spouse's transfers to inter vivos
trust), superseded by statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-25-2(b) (1956), as recognized in Barrett
v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 898 (R.I. 2006) (finding that illusory transfer test was supplanted
by statute).
42. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little Brown 1881).
43. Dower is a longstanding historical right that predates the formation of our nation
and has become embedded in common law. The right of dower is " 'so ancient, that its
origin is now lost in doubt and uncertainty.' " Pfau v. Moseley, 222 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ohio
1966) (quoting Dunseth v. Bank of the U.S., 6 Ohio 77, 78 (1833)).
44. See, e.g., Corp. Comm'n v. Dunn, 174 N.C. 679, 693, 94 S.E. 481, 482 (1917)
("[O]ne-third part of all the lands and tenants in which her husband had an estate of
inheritance, and of which he was seized at any time during the coverture, to hold for the
time of her natural life."). See generally George L. Haskins, The Development of Common
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husband acquired legal title to real property or upon marriage,
whichever occurred later." The reason for dower was "a very plain
and sensible one: for the sustenance of the wife and the rearing and
education of the younger children."46
At common law, a wife had an inchoate interest in her husband's
property during his lifetime.47 This interest could not be extinguished
by her husband's inter vivos conveyances. 4 8 Although the inchoate
right of dower was not considered an estate or a property interest,49 it
hindered the alienability of real estate by clouding title." An act of
the husband alone could not defeat the wife's right of dower.5' If the
husband conveyed land without his wife's consent even to a bona fide
purchaser, it passed subject to the wife's dower rights, so vendees
were reluctant to purchase land from married men.52 Because it
impeded alienability,53 common law dower was abolished in England
in 1925,"4 and it has also been abolished in nearly every state.
Similarly, husbands had a right to curtesy under common law.56
Upon marriage, a husband acquired a "tenancy by the marital right"
Law Dower, 62 HARv. L. REV. 42, 42 (1948) (describing that the effect of dower was to
give the wife rights in her husband's property if she survived him).
45. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423.
46. Griffin v. Griffin, 191 N.C. 227, 228-29, 131 S.E. 585, 586 (1926) (quoting Pridgen
v. Pridgen, 190 N.C. 102, 107, 129 S.E. 419, 422 (1925)).
47. Corp. Comm'n, 174 N.C. at 681, 94 S.E. at 482; see also 28 C.J.S. Dower & Curtesy
§ 54 (2008) ("The inchoate right of dower is the wife's interest in her husband's land
during his life; while it is not an estate, or title, or interest in land, but is a contingent right
or expectancy, it is nevertheless a valuable, subsisting, and distinct interest.").
48. See William T. Plumb, Jr., Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next
Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 605,615 (1968).
49. Corp. Comm'n, 174 N.C. at 681,94 S.E. at 482.
50. Andrew E. Tanick & Pamela L. Johnson, Note, Probate Reform: The New
Minnesota Elective Share Statutes, 70 MINN. L. REV. 241, 248 n.38 (1985).
51. In re Estate of Shroh, 392 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ("No contract of
sale or conveyance by a husband without his wife's signature will operate to divest her of
her dower.").
52. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 356 S.E.2d 422, 427 (S.C. 1987) ("The dower right
attaches to all lands of which the husband was seized during coverture, and his alienation
of this property without his wife's release or bar of her dower right does not affect her
dower interest."); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 6, at 423.
53. See G. Bryan Ulmer, Case Note, Trusts & Estates-Spousal Disinheritance-Inter
Vivos Trusts and Wyoming's Spousal Elective Share, Briggs v. Wyoming National Bank, 29
LAND & WATER L. REV. 323, 326 (1994) ("Over time many states began to recognize that
dower placed burdensome restrictions on the alienability of land, and legislatures began to
abolish the common law doctrines of dower and curtesy.").
54. HERBERT T. TIFFANY &BASIL JONES, 2 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 551 (1939).
55. See JAMES B. MCLAUGHLIN, JR. & RICHARD T. BOWSER, 1 WIGGINS WILLS &
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 17.2, at 536 (4th ed. 2008).
56. See George L. Haskins, Curtesy in the United States, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 196, 196
(1951) ("In England at common law a husband acquired upon marriage a right to the rents
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in all of the freehold estates of his wife.5 7 At the birth of inheritable
issue, the husband's interest vested, thereby entitling him to a life
estate in all of his wife's freehold estates.5 8
Although dower and curtesy provided some protection for
surviving spouses, both doctrines were easy to circumvent through
non-probate transfers.5 9 In 1784, North Carolina, instead of closing
the loopholes in common law dower, removed virtually all protection
for surviving spouses.
B. 1784-1869: Statutory Dower
In 1784, North Carolina abolished common law dower.'
Thereafter, a husband could defeat his wife's right to dower by inter
vivos conveyance.61 A widow was entitled to dower only in lands in
which her husband died seized and possessed.62  Between 1784 and
1867, a wife's dower rights were easy to circumvent because she was
not required to join in conveyances by the husband of his realty. 63
During this time, inter vivos conveyances could be used to deplete the
decedent spouse's probate estate and thereby defeat the surviving
spouse's dower rights. In order to provide more protection for
surviving spouses, North Carolina restored common law dower in
1869.64
C. 1869-1959: Common Law Dower Reinstated
From 1869 until 1959, dower was "the legal right of a widow
whose husband dies intestate, or when she dissents from his will, to
and profits, together with the use and enjoyment, of all the realty of which his wife was
then seised and of which she thereafter became seised during coverture .... If issue of the
marriage, capable of inheriting her property, were born alive, he then acquired in her
inheritable estates of which she had actual seisin an interest known as 'curtesy initiate,'
.... If he survived her, that interest became 'consummate,' and he was then said to be
'tenant by the curtesy' during his lifetime.").
57. McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 55, § 17.4, at 536.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Traub v. Zlatkiss, 559 So.2d 443, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
60. Bryan v. Bryan, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 47, 51 (1827) ("Our act of 1784 (Rev. c., 204,
s. 8) gives the wife dower only in the lands of which the husband died seized-whereas the
common law gave her much more extensive rights."). Unlike common law dower and
curtesy, rights under modern elective share statutes are not gender-specific since these
rights are almost certainly unconstitutional. See, e.g., Boan v. Watson, 316 S.E.2d 401, 403
(S.C. 1984) (holding that the common right of dower is unconstitutional in South
Carolina).
61. See Baird v. Winstead, 123 N.C. 181,182, 31 S.E. 390, 390-91 (1898).
62. Id.
63. Everett v. Ballard, 174 N.C. 16, 17, 93 S.E. 385, 386 (1917).
64. O'Kelly v. Williams, 84 N.C. 281,283 (1881).
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have allotted to her upon the death of her husband one-third in value
of all the lands, tenements, and hereditaments ... whereof her
husband was beneficially seized during the coverture."65 During this
period, dower included both legal and equitable title to real estate.66
A husband could not convey his real estate without joinder of his
wife, 67 but non-probate transfers, such as joint bank accounts and life
insurance, could be used to circumvent the right to dower.68
Mandatory dower and curtesy were replaced by the right-of-dissent
statute,69 but a surviving spouse may opt for dower rights (i.e., a life
estate in one-third of the decedent's property) in lieu of modern
elective share rights.7 °
D. 1959-2000: Right of Dissent
North Carolina adopted a version of an elective share statute in
1959.71 Under North Carolina's "right of dissent," a surviving spouse
was entitled to renounce the decedent spouse's will when "the total
value of property received under and outside the will" (i.e., non-
probate transfers) was "less than what he or she would have received
had the deceased spouse died intestate. '72 By exercising the right of
dissent, the surviving spouse was entitled to receive an intestate share
ranging from one-third to one-half of the decedent spouse's probate
estate.73 In some cases, the share of a second or successive spouse was
reduced by fifty percent.74
65. Pridgen v. Pridgen, 190 N.C. 102, 105,129 S.E. 419, 421 (1925).
66. MCLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 55, § 17.2, at 534.
67. Thomas v. Sandlin, 173 N.C. 329, 335, 91 S.E. 1028, 1031 (1917); see also Artis v.
Artis, 228 N.C. 754, 763, 47 S.E.2d 228, 234 (1948) (finding that title to land acquired by
son from father passed subject to dower right of father's widow).
68. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 605-06, 252 S.E.2d 761, 771 (1979).
Non-probate assets payable to the surviving spouse, such as life insurance, were taken into
consideration when determining the surviving spouse's intestate share. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 30-1(b) (1999) (repealed 2000).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (2007) (abolishing the common law rights of dower and
curtesy); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 (2007) (noting the statutory right of dissent for
the surviving spouse), amended by An Act to Revise the Existing Elective Share Statutes,
ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS 2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1).
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (allowing the surviving spouse to elect to take a life
estate in one third of value of the decedent spouse's real estate).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1999) (repealed 2000).
72. In re Kirkman's Estate, 302 N.C. 164, 166, 273 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1981); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 30-1(a) (1999) (repealed 2000).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1999) (repealed 2000).
74. Vinson v. Chappell, 275 N.C. 234, 238, 166 S.E.2d 686, 689-90 (1969). The share
of a second or successive spouse was reduced when the following conditions existed:
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To exercise the right of dissent, the surviving spouse had to
renounce all property he or she would have received under the
decedent spouse's will,75 including any property (inter vivos and
testamentary) the surviving spouse would have received in a pour-
over trust,76 but the surviving spouse was not required to renounce
non-probate assets.77 Because there was no requirement to renounce
non-probate assets, it was possible for surviving spouses to receive
more than an intestate share. 7' For example, if a surviving spouse
received a non-probate gift that was only slightly less than his or her
intestate share, he or she would be entitled to keep both the non-
probate gift and the elective share.79 This would result in a windfall
for the surviving spouse at the expense of the will's beneficiaries.0 A
decedent spouse, of course, could preclude the right of dissent by
devising to the surviving spouse the minimum amount required by the
intestate statute.81
1. Circumvention of the Right of Dissent: Three Judicial Tests
Like most traditional elective share statutes, North Carolina's
right of dissent failed "to foreclose the possibility of intentional
disinheritance. A surviving spouse's elective share ... [was] based on
a percentage of the decedent's 'net estate.' Because the net estate
includes only probate assets, a testator [could] effectively disinherit
his spouse by leaving his property to others through the use of will
(1) A married person, husband or wife, dies testate, survived by his (her) spouse.
(2) The surviving spouse, being entitled under G.S. § 30-1 to do so, dissents. (3)
The surviving spouse is a "second or successive spouse." (4) No lineal descendants
"by the second or successive marriage" survive the testator (testatrix). (5) The
testator (testatrix) is survived by lineal descendants by his (her) former marriage.
Id.
75. Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 605,252 S.E.2d 761, 770-71 (1979).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(c) (1999) (repealed 2000).
77. Phillips, 296 N.C. at 605, 252 S.E.2d at 770-71.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Jerry W. Leonard, Note, Does North Carolina Law Adequately Protect
Surviving Spouses?, 48 N.C. L. REv. 361, 365 (1970)).
80. Id.
81. In re Estate of Finch, 97 N.C. App. 489, 492, 389 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1990). A spouse
may also disclaim elective share rights. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.6 (2007) (providing
the rules for a surviving spouse to waive the elective share), amended by An Act to Revise
the Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC
LEGIS 2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.6); see also In
re Estate of Archibald, 183 N.C. App. 274, 281, 644 S.E.2d 264, 268 (2007) (holding that
husband's waiver of elective share rights in separation agreement was not enforceable
where husband and wife reconciled prior to wife's death).
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substitutes., 82 Will substitutes and other non-probate transfers could
be used by a spouse to deplete the probate estate and render the
elective share meaningless for the surviving spouse.
Between 1959 and 2000, North Carolina courts twice addressed
the use of will substitutes as a means of circumventing the right of
dissent.8 3 The exclusion of non-probate transfers from elective share
statutes, however, is not limited to North Carolina.8 Until recently,
most states had similar statutes.85 As a result, the common law
developed three tests-the illusory transfer test, the intent to defraud
test, and the reality test-that a surviving spouse could use to defeat
non-probate transfers and return such assets to the probate estate.86
As illustrated in Estate of Francis,87 however, these judicial tests still
did not offer much protection to surviving spouses in North Carolina,
so the public pressured the General Assembly to adopt the UPC
concept of the augmented estate.88
Illusory Transfer Test. This test asks whether the decedent
spouse has in good faith divested himself or herself of ownership of
the property or has made an illusory transfer.8 9 The "good faith"
requirement does not refer to the decedent's motive to affect the
surviving spouse but rather the intent to divest himself or herself of
the ownership of the property.9 °
The illusory transfer test has been adopted in many jurisdictions,
including South Carolina,9 and arguably by the North Carolina Court
of Appeals in Moore v. Jones.92 In Moore, a widow dissented to her
husband's will and sought to obtain an intestate share of an inter vivos
trust created by her husband.93 The husband retained the following
rights in the trust during his lifetime: the right to all income from the
trust assets, the right to withdraw assets from the trust, and the right
82. Phillips, 296 N.C. at 605-06, 252 S.E.2d at 771.
83. See Estate of Francis, 327 N.C. 101, 394 S.E.2d 150 (1990); Moore v. Jones, 44
N.C. App. 578, 261 S.E.2d 289 (1980).
84. See Bridge, supra note 7, at 519-21 (citing cases from several jurisdictions in which
spouses used non-probate transfers to evade elective share laws).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 519.
87. 327 N.C. 101, 394 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
88. See, e.g., Cobb, supra note 14, at 804.
89. Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d, 966, 969 (N.Y. 1937).
90. Id.
91. Dreher v. Dreher, 634 S.E.2d 646, 650 (S.C. 2002) (finding that the illusory
transfer test is invalid for elective share purposes).
92. 44 N.C. App. 578, 261 S.E.2d 289 (1980); see Dreher, 634 S.E.2d at 650 (noting that
the illusory transfer test was used in Moore).
93. Moore, 44 N.C. App. at 579-80,261 S.E.2d at 290.
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to amend, modify, or revoke the trust.9 4 The widow argued that the
trust assets should be included in the husband's net estate for
purposes of the right of dissent because the trust was the functional
equivalent of a will. The court of appeals agreed, holding;
[W]here, as here, the settlor retains up to the instant of his
death powers over the trust assets so extensive that in a real
sense he had the same rights therein after creating the trust as
he had before its creation, such assets should be considered part
of his estate insofar as the statutory rights granted the settlor's
surviving spouse.., are concerned."
Intent to Defraud Test. This test asks whether the decedent,
when making the transfer which reduced or defeated the surviving
spouse's elective share, intended to defraud the surviving spouse of
his or her marital right in the estate.96 Although evidence of actual
intent is generally required,97 some courts will infer fraudulent intent
from "a number of equitable factors ... including the proximity in
time between the transfer and the decedent's death, the proportion of
the settlor's property transferred to the trust, the absence of
consideration, and the fairness to the surviving spouse if the trust is
operative."98 The intent to defraud test has been criticized as both
overinclusive and underinclusive:
Motive or intent is an unsatisfactory test of the validity of a
transfer of property. In most jurisdictions it has been rejected,
sometimes for the reason that it would cast doubt upon the
validity of all transfers made by a married man, outside of the
regular course of business; sometimes because it is difficult to
find a satisfactory logical foundation for it. Intent may, at
times, be relevant in determining whether an act is fraudulent,
but there can be no fraud where no right of any person is
invaded. 99
94. Id.
95. Id. at 583, 261 S.E.2d at 292.
96. See In re Estate of Froman, 803 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that
the intent of the decedent spouse is a factor in considering whether the surviving spouse
was defrauded of her right to a portion of the estate).
97. See Johnson v. Farmers & Merch. Bank, 379 S.E.2d 752, 758 (W. Va. 1989).
98. Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 253 N.E.2d 417, 419 (Ill. 1969).
99. Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (N.Y. 1937).
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Because of these criticisms, the intent to defraud test has been
adopted by few jurisdictions00 and has never been used by North
Carolina courts.
Reality Test. This test asks whether the non-probate transfer was
a valid inter vivos conveyance. 10' In other words, the surviving spouse
may invalidate the non-probate transfer only if it was "purely fictional
or testamentary."' 2  Under the reality test, legitimate inter vivos
trusts, joint bank accounts, payable-on-death contracts, joint
tenancies, and life insurance policies are exempt from the elective
share. 03
Without expressly adopting a particular test, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina appears to have utilized the reality test in Estate of
Francis."° In that case, the decedent spouse opened several bank
accounts with her sister as joint tenants with right of survivorship. 105
Her probate estate was valued at slightly more than $2,000 while the
bank accounts were valued at more than $90,000.°6 Not surprisingly,
the husband dissented to the will and sought to obtain an intestate
share of the bank accounts. 7 The supreme court held that he was
not entitled to a portion of the joint bank accounts because funds held
in the joint accounts with right of survivorship passed to the surviving
joint tenant as a matter of law.'0°
In Estate of Francis, the surviving spouse argued that the joint
accounts should be included "in the net estate for purposes of the
dissent statute because the accounts here are similar to the funds in
the trust account held includable in the net estate in determining the
right to dissent" in Moore."9 The supreme court, however, declined
to extend Moore to joint bank accounts, reasoning that there is "no
legislative intent, express or implied, to make... bank accounts a part
100. See Johnson, 379 S.E.2d at 758 (observing that the intent to defraud test is "a
minority approach").
101. Bridge, supra note 7, at 521; see also Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 299, 307
(Mass. 1945) (denying the surviving spouse the right to reach assets decedent spouse had
transferred to a valid inter vivos trust), abrogated by Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572
(Mass. 1984).
102. Bridge, supra note 7, at 521.
103. Id. at 521-522.
104. 327 N.C. 101, 394 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
105. Id. at 103--04, 394 S.E.2d at 152.
106. Id. at 104-05, 394 S.E.2d at 152.
107. Id. at 104, 394 S.E.2d at 152.
108. Id. at 109, 394 S.E.2d at 155.
109. Id. at 111, 394 S.E.2d at 156.
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of the decedent's net estate for purposes of determining the surviving
spouse's right to dissent.""...
Estate of Francis made clear that will substitutes-like joint bank
accounts with right of survivorship, payable-on-death accounts, and
life insurance policies-may be used to disinherit a surviving spouse.
Not long thereafter, the public pressured the General Assembly to
provide more protection for surviving spouses. In particular, judges"'
and other critics of the North Carolina right of dissent"' called on the
General Assembly to adopt the augmented estate concept from the
Uniform Probate Code.
2. Uniform Probate Code
Although only twenty states have adopted the Uniform Probate
Code,"3 it has influenced the legislation and case law in nearly every
state, including North Carolina. "4 This is particularly true with
regard to elective share laws, as the UPC has been the guiding light in
this area of the law."15
a. 1969 Version of the UPC
Under the original version of the UPC, the surviving spouse's
elective share percentage was quite traditional: one-third of the
110. Id. at 112, 394 S.E.2d at 157 ("By express language in the statute, upon the death
of any party to the account, the survivor or survivors become the sole owners of the entire
unwithdrawn deposit subject only to the claims specifically enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 41-
2.1(b)(3) (1984).").
111. See, e.g., Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 605, 252 S.E.2d 761, 771 (1979) (noting
that the right of dissent statute could easily be circumvented by non-probate transfers);
Jerry W. Leonard, Note, Does North Carolina Law Adequately Protect Surviving
Spouses?, 48 N.C. L. REV. 361, 365-67 (1970) (calling on the North Carolina General
Assembly to protect spouses from disinheritance by including in the net estate all property
contributed by the decedent prior to death).
112. See, e.g., Charles H. Munn, Jr., Note, The Uniform Probate Code's Augmented
Estate Concept: A Remedy for the North Carolina Dissent Statute, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV.
425,444-46 (1990) (calling on North Carolina to adopt UPC's augmented estate concept).
113. JOYCE PALOMAR, 3 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 512 (3d ed. 2008).
States that have adopted the UPC include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wisconsin. Id.
114. See Taylor v. Nationsbank Corp., 125 N.C. App. 515, 518, 481 S.E.2d 358, 360
(1997) ("Although North Carolina has not adopted the Uniform Probate Code as such, it
has relied on it as persuasive authority.").
115. See Ronald R. Volkmer, Elective Share Issues Considered, 27 EST. PLAN. 334, 334
(2000) ("The elective share scheme of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) has been used as
the model for many legislatures in those states; about an equal number of states have
adopted the 1969 version of the UPC and the 1990 version.").
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probate estate. 16  But, unlike traditional elective share laws, the
surviving spouse did not receive one-third of the decedent spouse's
probate estate but rather one-third of a revolutionary new concept:
the augmented estate."7 The primary purpose of the augmented
estate was "to prevent the owner of wealth from making
arrangements which transmit his [or her] property to others by means
other than probate deliberately to defeat the right of the surviving
spouse to a share."'' l This purpose was accomplished by adding the
value of most non-probate transfers made by the decedent before
death to the decedent's probate estate." 9 As a result, traditional will
116. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(a) (1969) ("If a married person domiciled in this
state dies, the surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of one-third
of the augmented estate under the limitations and conditions hereinafter stated.").
Section 2-201(b) provided: "If a married person not domiciled in this state dies, the right,
if any, of the surviving spouse to take an elective share in property in this state is governed
by the law of the decedent's domicile at death." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-201(b) (1969).
See generally 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (2008) (entitling the surviving spouse in a state
with the traditional elective share to one-third of the estate for testators with descendants
or one-half of the estate for testators without descendants).
117. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1969).
118. Id. § 2-202 cmt. (1969). Another purpose of the augmented estate was "to prevent
the surviving spouse from electing a share of the probate estate when the spouse has
received a fair share of the total wealth of the decedent either during the lifetime of the
decedent or at death by life insurance, joint tenancy assets and other nonprobate
arrangements." Id.
119. Id. § 2-202 (1969). In particular, the following non-probate transfers to persons
other than the surviving spouse were included in the augmented estate:
(i) any transfer under which the decedent retained at the time of his death the
possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the property;
(ii) any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained at the time of his death a
power, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, to revoke or to
consume, invade or dispose of the principal for his own benefit;
(iii) any transfer whereby property is held at the time of decedent's death by
decedent and another with right of survivorship;
(iv) any transfer made within two years of death of the decedent to the extent that
the aggregate transfers to any one donee in either of the years exceed $3,000.
Id.
The augmented estate also included:
The value of property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death, plus
the value of property transferred by the spouse at any time during marriage to any
person other than the decedent which would have been includible in the spouse's
augmented estate if the surviving spouse had predeceased the decedent to the
extent the owned or transferred property is derived from the decedent, by any
means other than testate or intestate succession without a full consideration in
money or money's worth.
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substitutes, such as revocable trusts, joint tenancies with right of
survivorship, payable-on-death contracts, and joint bank accounts,
were included in the augmented estate and could no longer be used to
circumvent the elective share.
120
The 1969 version of the UPC, however, did not treat all non-
probate transfers alike. A few non-probate transfers were
deliberately excluded from the augmented estate. 12 In particular, the
UPC provided that "[n]othing herein shall cause to be included in the
augmented estate any life insurance ... payable to a person other
than the surviving spouse.' 1 22 Life insurance payable to third parties
was excluded from the augmented estate because the UPC drafters
thought that life insurance was "not ordinarily purchased as a way of
depleting the probate estate and avoiding the elective share of the
spouse."123
Thus, while the 1969 version of the UPC closed most of the non-
probate loopholes, it left one, life insurance, open on the assumption
that people would not use life insurance to disinherit their spouses.
Twenty-one years later, the UPC changed course and included life
insurance in the augmented estate.24
b. Revised 1990 Version of the UPC
Life insurance is one of the largest assets owned by the average
person, 125 but it was historically exempt from dower and elective share
laws. 26 This changed in 1990 when the Commissioners on Uniform
Id. § 2-202(3) (1969).
120. Id. § 2-202 (1969).
121. Id. The following non-probate transfers were excluded from the augmented
estate: "life insurance, accident insurance, joint annuity, or pension payable to a person
other than the surviving spouse." Id.
122. Id. By contrast, life insurance payable to the surviving spouse was included in the
augmented estate because it would be "unfair to allow a surviving spouse to disturb the
decedent's estate plan if the spouse has received ample provision from life insurance." Id.
123. Id. § 2-202 cmt. (1969).
124. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(l)(iv) cmt. (1990).
125. See Patrick J. Lannon, What Every Attorney Needs to Know About Estate
Planning, FLA. B. J., Nov. 2007, at 37, 37. According to the United States Census Bureau,
the average amount of life insurance per household in 1990 was $124,500. See Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce News, New Statistical Abstract Highlights Household
Lifestyles (Dec. 4, 1997), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/cb97-199.html (last visited
Aug. 26, 2009).
126. See, e.g., Nelson v. Metropolitan Tower Life Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 683, 688 n.11
(E.D. Ky. 1998) (holding that a wife has no statutory dower interest in her husband's life
insurance policy).
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State Laws included life insurance in the scope of the UPC's
augmented estate. 27 By this time, perceptions had changed.
By excluding life insurance assets from the surviving spouse's
forced share, states leave open a significant loophole for anyone
wishing to disinherit his or her spouse. Because life insurance
allows the insured to revoke the policy at any time prior to his
death, it is an attractive disinheriting device. Life insurance is
even more attractive under the U.P.C. augmented estate
concept because the augmented estate excludes life insurance
while including all other lifetime transfers where the transferor
retains power to revoke the transfer or to control the assets
during his lifetime. To provide uniformity of law and to protect
the well-settled public policy of preventing decedents from
disinheriting surviving spouses, states should permit surviving
spouses to reach life insurance assets with their forced share.128
Accordingly, UPC section 2-205 added life insurance payable to
third parties to the augmented estate, acknowledging that life
insurance may be "used to deplete the estate and reduce the spouse's
elective-share entitlement. ' 129 Thus, if the decedent spouse had a life
insurance policy on his or her own life with the proceeds payable to
someone other than the surviving spouse, 3 ° the full value of the
proceeds would be included in the augmented estate.13 1
The 1990 version of the UPC has been successful in preventing
the use of life insurance to disinherit surviving spouses. For example,
in Felix-Aranibar v. Felix,32 the decedent's surviving spouse brought
an action to include the decedent's group life insurance policy in the
127. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(1)(iv) cmt. (1990).
128. Bridge, supra note 7, at 527.
129. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(l)(iv) cmt. (1990); see Lawrence W. Waggoner,
The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights under the Revised Uniform Probate
Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 253 (1991) ("In the redesign of the elective share, the revised
UPC strengthens the augmented-estate concept. Students of the pre-1990 UPC ... will
know that several loopholes were left ajar in the augmented estate-a notable one being
life insurance the decedent buys, naming someone other than his or her surviving spouse
as the beneficiary. With appropriate protection for the insurance company that pays off
the beneficiary before receiving notice of an elective share claim, the redesigned elective
share closes that loophole, as well as the others.").
130. Life insurance payable to the surviving spouse is also included in the augmented
estate. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-207(a)(1)(iii) (1990).
131. Id. § 2-205 cmt. 8. (1990) ("G, as owner of a life-insurance policy insuring her life,
designated X and Y as the beneficiaries of that policy. G died owning the policy, survived
by S [G's surviving spouse], X, and Y. The full value of the proceeds of that policy is
included in the augmented estate under paragraph (1)(iv).").
132. No. W26889. 2002 WL 1941025 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2002).
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augmented estate.133 The beneficiary of the policy was the decedent's
first wife.' 34 The court determined that "the policy must be included
within the statute for the purpose of calculating the surviving spouse's
one-third statutory share of the decedent's estate,"'35 as the inclusion
of life "insurance policies within the augmented estate statute ...
provides greater protection for the wife against disinheritance."' 36
Thus, the UPC closed the life insurance loophole in 1990.
E. 2001-July 27, 2009: Elective Share
Effective January 1, 2001, North Carolina revised its elective
share law.'37 Under the new statute, the surviving spouse's elective
share percentage was the same: an intestate share ranging from one-
sixth to one-half depending on whether the decedent was survived by
descendants and whether the surviving spouse was a first spouse or a
successive spouse.138 Unlike North Carolina's former right-of-dissent
law, however, the surviving spouse's share under the new elective
share law comes from the decedent's "total net assets" and not the
decedent's probate estate.139 To prevent decedents from using non-
probate transfers to circumvent the elective share, the term "total net
assets," as originally defined, included:
(1) All property to which the decedent had legal and equitable
title immediately prior to death;
(2) All property received by the decedent's personal
representative by reason of the decedent's death, other than
wrongful death proceeds;
133. Id. at *1.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *7. Under Virginia law, the following assets are included in the augmented
estate: "insurance policies, retirement benefits exclusive of federal social security benefits,
annuities, pension plans, deferred compensation arrangements, and employee benefit
plans to the extent owned by, vested in, or subject to the control of the decedent on the
date of his death or the date of an irrevocable transfer by him during his lifetime." VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(D) (2007).
136. Felix-Aranibar, 2002 WL 1941025, at *3.
137. Act to Modify the Rights of a Decedent's Spouse, ch. 30, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws
1174 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 (2007), amended by An Act to Revise the
Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS
2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1)). For purposes of
Part I.E. and Part I.F., the citations to sections 30-3.1 to 3.6 of the General Statutes of
North Carolina will refer to the 2007 version, prior to the recent 2009 amendments.
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1(a) (2007).
139. Id. § 30-3.2(4).
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(3) One-half of the value of any property held by the decedent
and the surviving spouse as tenants by the entirety, or as joint
tenants with rights of survivorship;
(4) The entire value of any interest in property held by the
decedent and another person, other than the surviving spouse,
as joint tenants with right of survivorship, except to the extent
that contribution can be proven by clear and convincing
evidence;
(5) The value of any property which would be included in the
taxable estate of the decedent pursuant to sections 2033, 2035,
2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, or 2042 of the [Internal Revenue]
Code.
(6) Any donative transfers made by the decedent to donees
other than the surviving spouse within six months of the
decedent's death, excluding:
a. Any gifts within the annual exclusion provisions of
section 2503 of the Code;
b. Any gifts to which the surviving spouse consented. A
signing of a deed, or income or gift tax return reporting such
gift shall be considered consent; and
c. Any gifts made prior to marriage;
(7) Any proceeds of any individual retirement account, pension
or profit-sharing plan, or any private or governmental
retirement plan or annuity of which the decedent controlled the
designation of beneficiary, excluding any benefits under the
federal social security system;
(8) Any other Property Passing to Surviving Spouse under G.S.
30-3.3 ... 140
For purposes of non-probate assets, the most important part of
the new elective share statute is section 30-3.2(4)(e), which
incorporates by reference most of the provisions used by the Internal
Revenue Code to define the term "taxable estate" '141 for federal tax
140. An Act to Modify the Rights of a Decedent's Spouse, at 1175-76.
141. It is worth noting that the statute uses the term "taxable estate" rather than "gross
estate." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4). Taxable estate is defined as the decedent's gross
estate reduced by allowable deductions, such as the charitable deduction. In re Estate of
[Vol. 871890
THE UNMERRY WIDOW
purposes. 142  Under section 30-3.2(4)(e), the following non-probate
transfers-the ones most often used to evade the elective share-are
now included (fully or partially) in the decedent's total net assets:
revocable trusts, joint tenancies with right of survivorship, joint bank
accounts, and payable-on-death contracts.1 43 In addition, as originally
enacted, section 30-3.2(4)(e) incorporated by reference section 2042
of the Internal Revenue Code, which includes in the taxable estate
insurance on the life of the decedent for which the decedent held
"incidents of ownership" at death.1" "Incidents of ownership"
include "the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel
the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to pledge the
policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the
surrender value of the policy.' ' 45
Accordingly, if the decedent spouse held a life insurance policy
on his or her own life with a named beneficiary, the proceeds of such
policy would be included in the decedent's taxable estate for federal
tax purposes.46 For this reason, the proceeds would likewise be
included in the decedent's total net assets, as originally defined, for
Pope, __ N.C. App. -, -, 666 S.E.2d 140, 151 (2008) (holding that an inter vivos trust
created by decedent with remainder paid to charitable foundation is not included in
decedent's taxable estate for estate tax purposes and thus not included in the decedent's
total net assets). As a consequence, a decedent spouse who desires to leave his or her
property to charity could easily disinherit the surviving spouse.
142. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4).
143. David C. Johnson, Federal Estate, Gift, and Generation-Skipping Transfer
Taxation: A Review of the Arguments for Repeal and a Proposal for Simplification, 25 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 135, 135-36 (2000) (noting that the gross estate for purposes of the federal
estate tax includes non-probate assets such as revocable trusts, joint tenancies, and
pension benefits).
144. I.R.C. § 2042(2) (2008) ("[T]he amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as
insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in
conjunction with any other person [is included in the taxable estate].").
145. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1979). Incidents of ownership also
include:
a reversionary interest in the policy or its proceeds, whether arising by the express
terms of the policy or other instrument or by operation of law, but only if the value
of the reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent
exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy.
Id. § 20.2042-1(c)(3).
146. See generally GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT'S TRUSTS & TRUSTEES
§ 273.40 (2008) (noting that I.R.C. § 2042 requires that the value of the gross estate include
the proceeds of life insurance policies to which decedent possessed any incidents of
ownership at time of death, regardless of who the beneficiary was).
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purposes of North Carolina's elective share.147 Thus, as originally
promulgated, North Carolina's elective share statute protected
surviving spouses from intentional disinheritance, for there were no
major loopholes in the definition of "total net assets."
F. July 27, 2009-Present
Incredibly, a few weeks before this Article was published, the
General Assembly passed a session law that includes insurance on the
life of the decedent in the total net assets. 48 The General Assembly
deleted section 4 from North Carolina General Statutes section 30-3.2
and the references to the Internal Revenue Code. 149 The General
Assembly added new section 3f to section 30-3.2, which includes
insurance on the life of the decedent in the total net assets. 150 The
effect of this legislation is unknown; it will most likely protect
surviving spouses by including insurance in the total net assets, but it
includes no provision that specifically addresses its effect on
insurance companies. While the General Assembly is moving in the
right direction by protecting the surviving spouse, the new legislation
fails to address the question of insurance company liability, a question
addressed in Part IV of this Article. The new legislation also fails to
prevent a person from using an ILIT as a conduit to purchase a life
insurance policy that disinherits his or her surviving spouse.
II. ARGUMENTS TO REBUT THE EXCLUSION OF INSURANCE FROM
THE ELECTIVE SHARE
As originally written, North Carolina's elective share statute
included insurance proceeds in the elective share. As will be
discussed in Part III, before it was enacted, the General Assembly
deleted the reference to section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 '
North Carolina does not maintain detailed legislative history, so the
reason for the deletion of section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code
may never be known. An educated guess, though, can be made,
because the insurance industry has a long history of opposing the
147. Act to Modify the Rights of a Decedent's Spouse, ch. 30, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws
1174, 1175 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 (2007), amended by An Act to Revise the
Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS
2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1)).
148. An Act to Revise the Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess.
Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS 2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 30-3.1 to 3.6).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See infra Part III.
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inclusion of life insurance proceeds in elective share laws. 52 The
insurance industry opposed the inclusion of life insurance in the
augmented estate in the 1990 version of the UPC,'53 and it has
successfully prevented the inclusion of life insurance proceeds in the
elective share laws of other states.'54 Thus, it is likely that the deletion
of section 2042 in North Carolina's elective share law was the result of
insurance industry lobbying.
Why would the insurance industry oppose the inclusion of life
insurance proceeds in the elective share? Over the years, three
reasons have been suggested, each of which is addressed below.
A. The Argument that Life Insurance Is Not Used to Disinherit
Argument. Although life insurance is one of the most significant
modes of generational wealth transmission,'55 there is a belief that "it
is not ordinarily purchased as a way of depleting the probate estate
and avoiding the elective share."' 56 Because of this belief, life
insurance proceeds payable to third parties were excluded from the
original version of the UPC's augmented estate.'57
Rebuttal. The belief that life insurance is not used to disinherit
fails to recognize that life insurance possesses the same qualities as
wills: most life insurance policies are revocable until death and the
beneficiaries may be changed at any time.'58 Hence, life insurance is
the functional equivalent of other will substitutes, such as inter vivos
trusts, payable-on-death contracts, and joint bank accounts, which are
frequently used to evade elective share laws.'59 It is naive to assume
152. See Nathaniel W. Schwickerath, Note, Public Policy and the Probate Pariah:
Confusion in the Law of Will Substitutes, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 769, 801-02 (2000).
153. Susan N. Gary, The Oregon Elective Share Statute: Is Reform an Impossible
Dream?, 44 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 337,343 n.48 (2007).
154. Id. at 343 n.48, 362 n.159.
155. Lannon, supra note 125, at 37 ("Life insurance often represents the single largest
asset passing on death.").
156. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt. (1969) (explaining why life insurance was
excluded from the augmented estate in the 1969 version of the UPC).
157. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Pierson v. Buyher, 330 N.C. 182, 185, 409 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1991)
(demonstrating the similar characteristics and effects of life insurance policies and wills).
159. See Livesay v. Carolina First Bank, - N.C. App -,... 665 S.E.2d 158, 162 (2008)
("One other will substitute is a life insurance policy."); Steve G. Nilsson, Can Living
Trusts Defeat Elective Share?, FLA. B. J., Oct. 1996, at 34, 34 (discussing instances when
living trusts were used to evade the elective share); Stephanie J. Willbanks, Parting is Such
Sweet Sorrow, But Does It Have to Be So Complicated? Transmission of Property at Death
in Vermont, 29 VT. L. REV. 895, 922 (2005) (noting that will substitutes-such as life
insurance, annuities, joint tenancy, and revocable trusts-are beyond the reach of
Vermont's elective share statute).
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that a person inclined to disinherit his or her spouse would not use
life insurance to accomplish such a goal, particularly if life insurance
is the only mode of wealth transmission that is exempt from the
elective share statute.16°
Case law also disproves the belief that life insurance is not used
to evade elective share laws. For example, in Mitchell v. Mitchell,'
the decedent changed the beneficiary of his life insurance policy after
separating from his wife, thus removing the insurance proceeds from
both his probate estate and the scope of the elective share laws. 62
Finding the change of beneficiary to be illusory, the trial court
subjected the insurance proceeds to the surviving spouse's elective
share. 63 The appellate court reversed, pointing out that "[i]n making
the various changes in beneficiaries, the deceased exercised his
absolute right to do so. There was nothing illusory about any of the
changes. His contracts of insurance gave him that right."'" 4
Additionally, in In re Estate of Herron,65 the deceased spouse
transferred various life insurance policies to a revocable inter vivos
trust four years before death.166 Such transfers substantially depleted
the deceased spouse's probate estate, prompting the surviving spouse
to challenge the validity of the transfers. 167 The court concluded that
the insurance trust was a bona fide inter vivos transaction and, as
such, was exempt from the surviving spouse's elective share. 6
Although the North Carolina General Assembly may have
justified the deletion of section 2042 in part on the belief that life
160. See Gary, supra note 153, at 361 ("In addition to the fact that life insurance may
be a significant asset of an estate, if the augmented estate does not include life insurance, a
spouse will be able to use life insurance to avoid the elective share. If a spouse decided to
use insurance to transfer assets to someone other than the surviving spouse, the spouse
might enter into a contract that involved a significant premium. Insurance might become
the vehicle of choice for avoiding the elective share."); Bruce L. Stout & Audy M. Perry,
Jr., West Virginia Takes a Step Backward in Elective Share Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 679,
683 (1997) ("if life insurance is exempted, then life insurance will be the 'estate-depleting
transfer of choice' for people wanting to disinherit their surviving spouse.").
161. 37 N.Y.S.2d 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942), affd, 50 N.E.2d 106 (N.Y. 1943).
162. Id. at 614.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 615.
165. 237 So. 2d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
166. Id. at 564.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 568; see also Bullen v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 9 A.2d 581, 584-85 (Md.
1939) (holding that assets in a revocable life insurance trust are not subject to the surviving
spouse's elective share). But see In re Estate of Brown, 119 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa. 1956)
(holding that because the decedent retained lifetime control over the insurance trust, the
insurance proceeds were subject to the surviving spouse's elective share).
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insurance is not generally used to evade elective share laws, both
common sense and case law demonstrate that the belief is not well
founded.'69
B. The Argument that Insurance Companies Would Suffer Double
Exposure
Argument. The best reason suggested for excluding life
insurance proceeds from the elective share is to protect life insurance
companies from double-payment exposure 70 The probate process
can take months, if not years.7 ' After all, a surviving spouse has at
least six months to renounce the decedent spouse's will and demand
an elective share.172
One of the purposes of life insurance is to ensure that
beneficiaries have access to resources during the probate process. 73
Accordingly, life insurance proceeds are typically paid to the named
beneficiaries within days of the decedent's death. 74  The insurance
industry has resisted efforts to include life insurance proceeds in the
elective share because it claims that it would be forced to choose
between two undesirable options: 75 refuse to disburse life insurance
proceeds of married decedents to non-spousal beneficiaries for at
least six months, or pay the proceeds to the non-spousal beneficiaries
169. Cf. Succession of Lane, 95-0558 (La. App. 4 Cir. 09/28/95); 662 So. 2d 82, 82
(involving a father who used life insurance policies to circumvent children's forced share
rights under Louisiana law).
170. See MCLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 55, § 14:6, at 32.
171. Robert A. Esperti & Renno L. Peterson, Proper Drafting and Planning for the Use
of Revocable Trusts, 21 COLO. LAW. 2565, 2566 (1992) (indicating it took twelve to
eighteen months to close a probate estate).
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.4(b) (2007) ("A claim for an elective share must be made
within six months after the issuance of letters testamentary or letters of administration in
connection with the will or intestate proceeding with respect to which the surviving spouse
claims the elective share by (i) filing a petition with the clerk of superior court of the
county in which the primary administration of the decedent's estate lies, and (ii) mailing or
delivering a copy of that petition to the personal representative of the decedent's estate.
A surviving spouse's incapacity shall not toll the six-month period of limitations."),
amended by An Act to Revise the Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess.
Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS 2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 30-3.4).
173. See, e.g., Richard S. Kinyon & K. Bruce Friedman, Tax Planning for Estate &
Trust Distributions, 163 PRACTISING LAW INST. 137, 172, Feb. 1, 1986, available at
WESTLAW, 163 PLI/Est 137.
174. See McLAUGHLIN & BOWSER, supra note 55, § 14.6, at 32.
175. See Terry S. Kogan & Michael F. Thomson, Piercing the Facade of Utah's
"Improved" Elective Share Statute, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 677, 699 (1999) (reporting that the
Utah legislature excluded life insurance proceeds from the augmented estate because of
"pressure from the insurance industry").
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and risk subsequent litigation by the surviving spouse for wrongful
payment.17
6
Rebuttal. While the insurance industry's concern is legitimate, it
presents a false dilemma. There is a third option: a statute that
includes life insurance proceeds in the elective share with a provision
to protect insurance companies for payments made in good faith prior
to notice of the surviving spouse's demand for an elective share. 77
Part IV of this Article proposes legislation that protects both
surviving spouses and insurance companies.
C. The Argument that Deletion of Section 2042 Promotes the
Purchase of Insurance
Argument. Another reason has been suggested for the exclusion
of life insurance proceeds from the elective share law in North
Carolina. By removing life insurance proceeds from the elective
share, the life insurance industry is likely to see an increase in its
business because life insurance would become the estate-depleting
asset of choice. 17
8
Rebuttal. Although life insurance is now the option of choice for
persons inclined to disinherit their spouses, it seems unlikely that the
General Assembly attempted to create a life insurance loophole to
give the insurance industry an unfair advantage over other modes of
generational wealth transfer. It is more likely that the General
Assembly based its decision on the belief that life insurance is not
176. See id.; see also Domenico Zaino, Jr., Commentary, The Practical Effect of
Extending Revocation by Divorce Statutes to Life Insurance, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 213, 234
n.120 (1996) (noting that the 1990 UPC added a good faith payment provision to placate
insurance companies).
177. Tanick & Johnson, supra note 50, at 258-59.
A more plausible explanation for the UPC's exclusion of life insurance and
pension benefits from the augmented estate rests on the fear that insurance
companies or pension funds will be liable to both the electing spouse and to the
third party beneficiary if the benefits are included in the augmented estate. This
fear, however, is unfounded. An earlier intestate succession bill introduced in the
Minnesota Senate demonstrates how the legislature may avoid this problem of
double liability. The bill would have relieved a "payer" of benefits from liability
to a surviving spouse once the named beneficiary had been paid, unless the payer
had notice of the spouse's intention to file for an elective share. Absent notice, the
insurer or pension plan would not be liable for merely paying the named
beneficiary. Such a provision would thus protect payers from double liability, and
at the same time protect surviving spouses' rights to an elective share.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
178. See Cobb, supra note 14, at 818-19.
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used to evade the elective share or to protect life insurance
companies from double exposure.
III. LIFE INSURANCE LOOPHOLE
179
On July 21, 2000, after the adoption of section 30-3.2(4) but
nearly six months prior to its effective date, the General Assembly
made a seemingly minor, technical revision to section 30-3.2(4)(e) by
deleting "2042" from the list of Internal Revenue Code provisions set
forth therein.180 In doing so, the General Assembly attempted to
exclude life insurance from the decedent's total net assets. Until now,
legal commentators have assumed the General Assembly
accomplished its goal. 81 A question remains, however, as to whether
life insurance may be included in the decedent's total net assets under
one of the other provisions of section 30-3.2(4). This question will be
addressed below.
A. Life Insurance Is Not Included in the Decedent's Total Net Assets
Under Sections 30-3.2(4)(a)-(d) or (f)-(i)
As detailed below, life insurance policies with non-spousal
beneficiaries are not included in "total net assets" under North
Carolina General Statutes sections 30-3.2(4)(a)-(d) or (f)-(i). These
sections encompass most property owned by the average person, but
not traditional life insurance policies.
Under section 30-3.2(4)(a), "[a]ll property to which the decedent
had legal and equitable title immediately prior to death" is included
in the decedent's total net assets.182 This subsection requires that the
decedent have both legal and equitable title immediately prior to
179. For purposes of Part III., citations to sections 30-3.1 to 3.6 of the General Statutes
of North Carolina will refer to the 2007 version, prior to the recent 2009 amendments
found in An Act to Revise the Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess.
Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS 2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 30-3.1 to 3.6).
180. An Act to Modify the Rights of a Decedent's Spouse, ch. 30, § 92, 2000 N.C. Sess.
Laws 737, 806 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.4(b) (2007), amended by An Act to
Revise the Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at
NC LEGIS 2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.4).
Section 30-3.2(4)(e) then read: "The value of any property which would be included in the
Taxable Estate of the decedent pursuant to sections 2033, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, or
2040 of the [Internal Revenue] Code." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4)(e) (2007).
181. See Cobb, supra note 14, at 818-19.
182. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 30-3.2(4)(a); see also In re Estate of Pope, - N.C. App.....
666 S.E.2d 140, 150-51 (2008)(noting that the total net assets include all property to which
the decedent had "legal and equitable title" before death).
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death. For life insurance policies with named beneficiaries, the
decedent may have legal title but does not have equitable title. 83
Under section 30-3.2(4)(b), "[a]ll property received by the
decedent's personal representative by reason of the decedent's death,
other than wrongful death proceeds" are included in the decedent's
total net assets."8 Because life insurance proceeds are paid directly to
the named beneficiary and are not part of the decedent's probate
estate, this provision would not apply to life insurance proceeds
(except those payable to the decedent's estate or executor).1 85 In
addition, life insurance proceeds would not be covered by sections 30-
3.2(4)(c) and 4(d) because those subsections are limited to property
held by the decedent and others as joint tenants with right of
survivorship or tenants by the entirety.186 Life insurance policies
usually have only one owner.'87
Section 30-3.2(4)(f) applies to gifts made by the decedent within
six months of death.'88 For this subsection to apply, the gift must be
completed during the decedent spouse's lifetime.'89 A gift is not
complete unless the gifted property is delivered during the decedent
spouse's lifetime. 9 ° For example, if the decedent spouse creates an
inter vivos trust with the remainder paid to a third party at the
decedent spouse's death, delivery of the remainder does not occur
until after the decedent spouse's death, and thus section 30-3.2(4)(f) is
inapplicable. 9' For the same reason, section 30-3.2(4)(f) would not
apply to a beneficial interest in a life insurance policy. The typical life
insurance policy involves two transfers. The first transfer occurs
when the decedent purchases the policy from the insurance company.
This transfer would not trigger section 30-3.2(4)(f) because life
183. In re Pope, - N.C. App. at -, 666 S.E.2d at 151. Moreover, if the policy is held
by an ILIT, the decedent would own neither legal nor equitable title. Id. (noting that in
trusts, the trustee owns legal title and the beneficiary owns equitable title).
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4)(b).
185. See In re Estate of Perry, 2008-Ohio-351, 91 16-26, No. 2007-03-061, 2008 WL
282067, at *3-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2008) (omitting life insurance proceeds from the
probate assets).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4)(c), (d) (2007). Section 30-3.2(4)(e) will be addressed
in Part III.B., infra.
187. See, e.g., Estate of Street v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1787, 1787 (1997) (noting
that decedent was the sole owner of four insurance policies on his life); Charles W. Bauer,
Protecting an Elderly Client's Assets, 26767 NAT'L. Bus. INST. 72, 126, Mar. 17, 2005,
available at WESTLAW, 26767 NBI-CLE 72 ("The owner of a life insurance policy is the
insured unless otherwise noted on the policy .....
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4)(f).





insurance policies are contracts, not gifts. 19 2 The second transfer
occurs when the insurance company disburses the proceeds to the
named beneficiary. This transfer could not trigger section 30-3.2(4)(f)
because it occurs after the decedent's death.
193
By its terms, section 30-3.2(4)(g) is limited to individual
retirement accounts, pensions, profit-sharing plans, and private or
governmental retirement plans and annuities; it does not cover life
insurance. 19 4  Finally, section 30-3.2(4)(h) is limited to property
passing to the surviving spouse.'95 Although this provision would
cause inclusion of life insurance proceeds payable to the surviving
spouse in the decedent's total net assets, it would not cause inclusion
of life insurance proceeds payable to third parties in such assets.' 96
As a consequence, if life insurance proceeds payable to third
parties are included in the decedent's total net assets, the inclusion
must result from section 30-3.2(4)(e), which, in turn, incorporates
sections 2033 and 2035-2040 of the Internal Revenue Code.
B. Life Insurance is Included in the Decedent's Taxable Estate Under
Internal Revenue Code Sections 2035 and 2038
As originally written, section 30-3.2(4)(e) included in the
decedent's "total net assets" all assets included in the "taxable estate"
under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code for federal estate
tax purposes. 91 Under this provision, life insurance proceeds payable
to third parties would be included in the decedent's total net assets.'98
However, as explained above, section 2042 of the Internal Revenue
Code was deleted from section 30-3.2(4)(e) in 2000 in an attempt to
remove life insurance proceeds from the decedent's total net assets.'99
192. See, e.g., Cullen v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 161 N.C. App. 570, 574, 589 S.E.2d
423, 428 (2003) ("A life insurance policy is a contract.").
193. See In re Pope, -, N.C. App. at -, 666 S.E.2d at 150-51.
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4)(g) (2007).
195. Id. § 30-3.2(4)(h).
196. See id. §§ 30-3.2(4)(h), 30-3.3(a)(5) (stating that the property that passes to the
surviving spouse includes his interest, "outright or in trust," in any insurance proceeds
from policies on his life).
197. See supra Part I.E.
198. An Act to Modify the Rights of a Decedent's Spouse, ch. 30, 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws
1174 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1 (2007), amended by An Act to Revise the
Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS
2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.1)).
199. See Cobb, supra note 14, at 817-18 (arguing that the North Carolina General
Assembly deleted I.R.C. section 2042 from the decedent spouse's total net assets with the
intent to remove life insurance proceeds from inclusion in such assets).
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Under federal law, however, life insurance policies may be
included in the taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes under
provisions other than section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code,200 as
there is substantial overlap between section 2042 and other provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code.2 1 Indeed, legal experts agree that in
addition to Internal Revenue Code section 2042, "[o]ther sections of
the [Internal Revenue] Code may ... include insurance proceeds in
the gross estate," specifically sections 2036 through 2038.202
Accordingly, as shown below, it seems likely that life insurance
proceeds payable to third parties are still included in the decedent's
total net assets despite the deletion of section 2042.
As revised, section 30-3.2(4)(e) includes in the decedent's total
net assets "It]he value of any property which would be included in the
taxable estate of the decedent pursuant to sections 2033, 2035, 2036,
2037, 2038, 2039, or 2040 of the [Internal Revenue] Code., 2 3 To the
extent relevant to North Carolina's elective share law, each of these
provisions is examined below.
I.R.C. Section 2033. According to section 2033 of the Internal
Revenue Code, "[t]he value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at
the time of his death. ' 204 Section 2033 is roughly synonymous with
the decedent's probate estate, 20 5 and the law is clear that life
insurance proceeds payable to named beneficiaries are not included
in the decedent's probate estate.20 6 In addition, the predecessor to
section 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted two years
before the predecessor to section 2042;217 during this two-year period,
life insurance proceeds payable to the decedent's estate were
200. BOGERT, supra note 146, § 273.40.
201. See, e.g., John T. Gaubatz, A Generation Shifting Transfer Tax, 12 VA. TAX REV.
1, 13 (1992) (noting overlap between I.R.C. sections 2038 and 2042); MAUNSEL W.
HICKEY ET AL., LOUISIANA PRACTICE § 5:66 (2009) (observing interplay between I.R.C.
sections 2035 and 2042).
202. J. MARTIN BURKE ET AL., 1 MODERN ESTATE PLANNING § 9.04 (2008).
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4)(e) (2007).
204. I.R.C. § 2033 (2008).
205. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, PROBATE ASSETS 5.5.7.5 (2005), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm 05-005-007.html#doe8O.
206. See, e.g., In re Estate of Perry, 2008-Ohio-351, TT 16, No. 2007-03-061, 2008 WL
282067, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2008) (omitting life insurance proceeds from probate
assets).
207. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 777-78 (1916) (codified as I.R.C. § 202
(1916), predecessor of I.R.C. § 2033 (2008)); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057,
1098 (1919) (codified as I.R.C. § 402(f) (1919). predecessor of I.R.C. § 2042 (2008)).
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included in the taxable estate, but life insurance proceeds payable to
named beneficiaries were not.08
I.R.C. Section 2035. Under some circumstances, a life insurance
policy with a non-spousal beneficiary will be included in the
decedent's taxable estate under section 2035(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code and thus in the decedent's total net assets under
section 30-3.2(4)(e). According to section 2035(a), if the decedent
transfers an interest in property within three years of death, and the
value of such property would have been included in the decedent's
gross estate under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code if the
transferred interest had been retained by the decedent on the date of
his death, the value of the gross estate shall include the value of any
property which would have been so included.20 9 In other words:
Section 2035(a) will apply if the decedent possessed an incident
of ownership [e.g., the right to change beneficiaries] in the life
insurance policy at some time during the three-year period
prior to death and transferred such incident of ownership
during the same period. Thus, the relevant frame of reference
for purposes of § 2035 is not merely the time of death, but the
three-year period preceding death. If during the three-year
period preceding death, the decedent possessed incidents of
ownership ... and the decedent subsequently relinquished the
incidents of ownership by assignment of the policy ... the
application of § 2035(a) will be triggered.21°
As a consequence, a person inclined to disinherit his or her
spouse in North Carolina would have to be careful doing so with
existing life insurance policies. If the decedent spouse transferred
such policies to an ILIT (or third party) within three years of death,
the proceeds of such policies would be included in the decedent's
total net assets under section 2035(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
and section 30-3.2(4)(e) of the North Carolina General Statutes. 211
It is important to note, however, that section 2035(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code does not apply to new life insurance
policies. 12 If the decedent spouse wishes to purchase a new life
208. BORIS I. BITTKER, ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION 364-65 (9th ed.
2005).
209. I.R.C. § 2035(a) (2008).
210. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199905010 (Oct. 30, 1998).
211. See, e.g., Michael A. Kirtland, What Every Divorce Attorney Should Know About
Taxes, 61 ALA. LAW., Mar. 2000, at 116, 120 ("If an existing policy is transferred to the
ILIT, the non-inclusion of the policy benefits in the estate of the insured will only occur
after three years from the date of transfer to the ILIT.").
212. I.R.C. § 2035(a) (2008).
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insurance policy with assurance that the proceeds of such policy will
not be included in his or her total net assets,
he or she should create a new ILIT, make a cash gift to the new
ILIT and have the ILIT purchase the new life insurance policy.
This avoids the 3-year rule under I.R.C. section 2035 which
would result if the grantor purchased the policy and then
transferred it to the ILIT.213
In addition, section 2035(a) does not apply to life insurance
policies purchased by the decedent within three years of death if,
at the time of purchase, the beneficiaries or anyone other than the
decedent are designated as the owners of such policies. 14 This is
true regardless of the fact that the decedent paid all premiums on
the life insurance policy.215
It is possible, therefore, that some life insurance policies will be
included in a decedent spouse's total net assets under section 2035(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code and section 30-3.2(4)(e) of the General
Statutes of North Carolina. This result is unlikely to occur, however,
if the decedent spouse is predisposed to disinherit the surviving
spouse and is searching for a legal loophole, since section 2035(a) is
relatively easy to circumvent.
I.R.C. Section 2036. Under section 2036 of the Internal Revenue
Code, the value of property is included in a decedent's taxable estate
if the decedent retained for life "(1) the possession or enjoyment of,
or the right to the income from, the property, or (2) the right, either
alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who
shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom. 216
Section 2036 is most often used to include in the decedent's taxable
estate the value of the remainder interest in a trust if the decedent
retained the income interest for life.21 7  For instance, if a person
establishes an inter vivos trust that holds a life insurance policy on his
or her life and he or she retains an income interest in the trust, the full
213. Domingo P. Such, Fix-ups of Estate Plans after They have Become Irrevocable,
SK093 ALI-ABA 137, 148, June 19-24, 2005, available at WESTLAW, SK093 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 137.
214. In re Estate of Perry v. Comm'r, 927 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1991).
215. In re Estate of Tracy v. U.S., No. C-C-81-56-P, 1982 WL 1716, at *5 (W.D.N.C.
Sep. 3, 1982).
216. I.R.C. § 2036 (2008).
217. ALINE F. ANDERSON & DIANE KENNEDY, ANDERSON'S WILLS,
TRUSTS & ESTATE PLANNING § 10:11 (2009).
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value of the insurance proceeds will be included in the person's
taxable estate under section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code.218
Because life insurance policies do not have traditional income
interests, there is no authority known to the author supporting
inclusion of life insurance policies held by the decedent outright (and
not in trust) in the taxable estate under section 2036.219 If the policy
has an income or income-like interest, the proceeds would probably
be included in the decedent's taxable estate under section 2036 of the
Internal Revenue Code and total net assets under section 30-3.2(4)(e)
of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Such inclusion could be
avoided though, if at the time the decedent purchases the policy, he
or she designates someone else (e.g., the beneficiary or an ILIT) as
the owner of the policy. 2
°
I.R.C. Section 2037. Under section 2037 of the Internal Revenue
Code, the value of property transferred by the decedent will be
included in the decedent's taxable estate if the decedent retained
more than a de minimis reversionary interest.21 People who purchase
life insurance policies with named beneficiaries typically do not retain
reversionary interests.222 Thus, section 2037 would rarely cause
inclusion of the proceeds of a life insurance policy in the decedent's
taxable estate. If a decedent spouse wishes to ensure that life
insurance proceeds are excluded from the scope of section 2037, he or
she could designate someone else (e.g., the beneficiary or an ILIT) as
the owner of the policy.2 23
I.R.C. Section 2038. The greatest hurdle for a person intending
to disinherit his or her spouse with life insurance in North Carolina is
section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code. Under section 2038,
218. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-26-002 (June 26, 1998).
219. Section 2036 includes in the decedent's taxable estate "the value of all property to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer...
by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life ... the possession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property .... I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1)
(2008). An insured does not have an income interest in his or her own life insurance
policy.
220. See supra Introduction (explaining the use of an ILIT).
221. I.R.C. § 2037 (2008).
222. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 577, 584 (N.D. II. 1960)
(excluding life insurance proceeds from the decedent's estate under I.R.C. § 2037 because
decedent retained no reversionary interests). A reversionary interest generally follows a
life estate or lease. For life insurance policies on the decedent's life, the decedent's
interest in the policy ends at his or her death; thus, the decedent has no reversionary
interest in the policy. Id.
223. See Bennett, 185 F. Supp. at 586-87 (excluding from the gross estate life insurance
policies transferred to an irrevocable trust not included under the predecessor to section
2037 of the Internal Revenue Code).
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property the decedent transferred during life in which he or she
retained the power to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate" is
included in the decedent's taxable estate.224 For instance, if the
decedent creates a revocable trust that holds insurance policies on the
decedent's life, the proceeds of such policies are included in the
decedent's taxable estate under section 2038 of the Internal Revenue
Code and hence would be included in the decedent's total net assets
under section 30-3.2(4)(e) of the North Carolina General Statutes. 25
It is safe to assume, therefore, that an insurance policy on the
decedent's life that he or she owns outright (i.e., not in trust) would
likewise be included in the decedent's taxable estate under section
2038 because the decedent would have the power to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate the policy by, for example, changing
beneficiaries or canceling the policy.226 Thus, despite the deletion of
section 2042 from section 30-3.2(4)(e) of the North Carolina General
Statutes, most life insurance proceeds would still be subject to the
surviving spouse's elective share rights under section 2038 of the
Internal Revenue Code. This would include any policy on the life of
the decedent spouse for which the decedent possessed the right to
change beneficiaries or to surrender or cancel the policy; most
policyholders retain such rights until death. 27 Inclusion of a life
insurance policy under section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code is
avoidable, however, if at the time the decedent purchases the policy,
he or she designates someone else (e.g., the beneficiary or an ILIT) as
the owner of the policy and retains no powers or interests whatsoever
in the policy.2
8
I.R.C. Section 2039. Under section 2039 of the Internal Revenue
Code, annuities with survivorship benefits are included in the taxable
estate of the original annuitant. 229 By its very terms, section 2039 does
not apply to life insurance policies on the life of the decedent.
224. I.R.C. § 2038 (2008).
225. See, e.g., HICKEY ET AL., supra note 201, at 111.
226. See Gaubatz, supra note 201, at 12-13.
227. 5 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 67:28, at 67-38
(3d. ed. 2005) ("Life insurance policies ordinarily reserve to the insured the right to
change beneficiaries thereunder, and to surrender the policy for cash, borrow from the
insurer up to its reserve value, or permit it to lapse for nonpayment of premiums.").
228. Joshua S. Rubenstein, Understanding Estate, Gift and Generation-Skipping
Transfer Taxes 317 PRACTISING LAW INST. 7, 49, July 9, 2002, available at WESTLAW,
317 PLI/Est 7; 2 EDWARD F. KOREN & ROBERT H. WALTUCH, ESTATE AND PERSONAL
FINANCIAL PLANNING § 22.09 (2008).
229. I.R.C. § 2039 (2008) ("The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under
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I.R.C. Section 2040. Section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code
applies to property held by the decedent as a joint tenant with right of
survivorship or tenant by the entirety.3 1 It would not apply to life
insurance policies because such policies rarely have more than one
owner.
232
In summary, the General Assembly failed in its goal to create an
insurance loophole because, even in the absence of section 2042 of
the Internal Revenue Code, the proceeds of a typical insurance policy
on the life of the decedent will be included in the decedent's taxable
estate under section 2038 (or section 2035) of the Internal Revenue
Code and hence will be included in the decedent's total net assets
under section 30-3.2(4)(e) of the General Statutes of North
Carolina.233 Such inclusion is avoidable if, at the time the decedent
purchases the policy, he or she designates someone else (e.g., the
beneficiary or an ILIT) as the owner of the policy and retains no
powers or interests whatsoever in it. Thus, with a little planning, life
insurance can be used in North Carolina to disinherit one's spouse.234
In Part IV, this Article proposes legislation that will allow the
any form of contract or agreement. . . (other than as insurance under policies on the life of
the decedent).").
230. Id.
231. Id. § 2040 ("The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of the interest therein held as joint tenants with right of survivorship by the
decedent and any other person, or as tenants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse
232. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
233. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.2(4)(e) (2007).
234. Notwithstanding the fact that most life insurance policies fit easily within the
scope of section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code and thus within the scope of section
30-3.2(4)(e) of the General Statutes of North Carolina, a case could be made for the
exclusion of all insurance proceeds payable to non-spousal beneficiaries from the elective
share statute. Such a case would be based on the following rule of statutory construction:
" 'It is ordinarily to be presumed that the Legislature by deleting an express provision of a
statute intended a substantial change in the law.' " People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 712
(Cal. 1983) (quoting People v. Valentine, 169 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal. 1946)); see also Landers v.
Pickering, 427 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) ("A fundamental rule of statutory
construction is where a prior statute contains certain language, and a latter statute deletes
the language, it is presumed that the legislature was cognizant of the prior language and
intended to change the law by the deletion."). As applied to section 30-3.2(4)(e) of the
General Statutes of North Carolina, the argument would proceed as follows: by deleting
section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code, the General Assembly intended to effect a
substantial change to the law, specifically, the removal of life insurance proceeds from the
elective share statute. Any other interpretation of the deletion of section 2042 would
render the General Assembly's action superfluous. Thus, life insurance proceeds payable
to non-spousal beneficiaries should be excluded from the elective share statute despite the
fact that they are technically covered by other provisions of section 30-3.2(4)(e).
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General Assembly to protect both insurance companies from
excessive liability and surviving spouses.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Based on the recent action of the General Assembly, insurance
proceeds from an insurance policy on the life of the decedent are now
included in the elective share.235 New legislation is needed, however,
to protect insurance companies from excessive liability. New
legislation also is needed to prevent a person from using an ILIT as a
conduit to purchase a life insurance policy that disinherits his or her
surviving spouse.
A. Proposed New Section 30-3.7 of the North Carolina General
Statutes
To protect insurance companies that make good faith payments
to named beneficiaries before being notified of the surviving spouse's
demand for an elective share, the following provision should be
enacted as a new section 30-3.7 of the North Carolina General
Statutes:
Insurance Company Liability. An insurance company is not
liable for having made a payment to a person designated in a
life insurance policy who, under this Article, is not entitled to
the payment, or for having taken any other action in good faith
reliance on the person's apparent entitlement under the terms
of the insurance policy, before the insurance company received
written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under this
Article. An insurance company is liable for a payment made or
other action taken after the insurance company received
written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under this
Article. Written notice of a claimed lack of entitlement under
this Article must be mailed to the insurance company's main
office by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested,
or served upon the insurance company in the same manner as a
summons in a civil action. Upon receipt of written notice of a
claimed lack of entitlement under this Article, an insurance
company may pay any amount owed to the clerk of the superior
court having jurisdiction of the probate proceedings relating to
the decedent's estate, or if no proceedings have been
commenced, to or with the clerk of the superior court having
235. An Act to Revise the Existing Elective Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess.
Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS 2009-368 (2009) (Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 30-3.1 to 3.6).
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jurisdiction of probate proceedings relating to decedent's estate
located in the county of the decedent's residence. The clerk
shall hold the funds and, upon the clerk's determination under
this Article, shall order disbursement in accordance with the
determination. Payments, transfers, or deposits made to or
with the clerk discharge the insurance company from all claims
for the value of amounts paid to or deposited with the clerk.236
The proposed statute protects insurance companies from wrongful
payment lawsuits by surviving spouses.
As a consequence, life insurance proceeds payable to third
parties would be subject to the surviving spouse's elective share under
one of two scenarios: first, the surviving spouse could notify the
insurance company of his or her elective share rights prior to
disbursement of the proceeds, at which point the insurance company
could protect itself by depositing the proceeds with the clerk of the
probate court; or second, if disbursement of the proceeds to the
beneficiaries has already occurred, the decedent's personal
representative could attempt to retrieve the life insurance proceeds
(or at least the appropriate portion thereof) from the beneficiaries.237
236. This proposed provision is an adaptation of section 28A-24-8 of the North
Carolina General Statutes and Uniform Probate Code section 2-214. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-24-8 (2007); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-214 (1990).
237. The personal representative is authorized to pursue such payments under section
30-3.5(a) of the General Statutes of North Carolina, which provides:
The personal representative is entitled to recover proportionately from all
persons, other than the surviving spouse, receiving or in possession of any of the
decedent's Total Net Assets a sufficient amount to enable the personal
representative to pay the elective share. The apportionment shall be made in the
proportion that the value of the interest of each person receiving or in possession
of any of Total Net Assets bears to Total Net Assets, excluding any Property
Passing to Surviving Spouse. The only persons subject to contribution to make up
the elective share are (i) original recipients of property comprising the decedent's
Total Net Assets, and subsequent gratuitous inter vivos donees or persons
claiming by testate or intestate succession to the extent those persons have the
property or its proceeds on or after the date of decedent's death, and (ii) a
fiduciary, as to the property under the fiduciary's control at or after the time a
fiduciary receives notice that a surviving spouse has claimed an elective share. A
fiduciary shall not be considered to have notice until it receives notice at its
address as shown in the decedent's estate papers in the clerk's office or, if there
are no such papers or no such address is shown in those papers, at the fiduciary's
residence or the office of its registered agent.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.5(a) (2007), amended by An Act to Revise the Existing Elective
Share Statutes, ch. 30, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 368, available at NC LEGIS 2009-368 (2009)
(Westlaw) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3.5).
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CONCLUSION
For centuries, North Carolina more or less tolerated spousal
disinheritance. In 1959, North Carolina adopted a "right of dissent"
statute that authorized a surviving spouse to renounce the decedent
spouse's will and in lieu thereof elect to receive a statutorily
prescribed share of the decedent spouse's probate estate. Because
the elective share statute was limited to the decedent spouse's
probate estate, it was easily circumvented through the use of non-
probate transfers, such as inter vivos trusts, joint tenancies, payable-
on-death contracts, and life insurance. In 1969, the UPC sought to
close the non-probate loophole by expanding the reach of the elective
share to an "augmented estate" comprised of the decedent spouse's
probate estate and all non-probate transfers made by the decedent
spouse during life. The purpose of the augmented estate was to
prevent spouses from deliberately disinheriting each other.
In 2001, the General Assembly of North Carolina adopted a
version of the augmented estate. Shortly before the effective date,
the General Assembly made what appeared to be a technical revision
to the law. The goal of this ostensibly technical revision was to
remove life insurance proceeds from the scope of the elective share.
Until now, legal commentators have assumed that the General
Assembly successfully removed life insurance proceeds from North
Carolina's elective share statute. This Article demonstrates, however,
that despite the legislature's action, most life insurance proceeds
payable to non-spousal beneficiaries are probably still included in the
surviving spouse's elective share.239
Although the General Assembly failed in its effort to create a
major life insurance loophole in North Carolina's elective share
statute, a minor life insurance loophole-using an ILIT as a conduit
for the insurance policy-still exists. This Article refutes the
purported justifications for treating life insurance differently than
other non-probate transfers and proposes legislation designed to close
the existing life insurance loophole in North Carolina's elective share
law in a manner that does not expose insurance companies to
needless litigation.239  At least one jurisdiction-Virginia-has
enacted such a law2 40 and has successfully prevented the evasion of
238. See supra Part III.B.
239. See supra Part IV.; see also Zaino, supra note 176, at 234 n.120 (noting that the
1990 UPC added a good faith payment provision to placate insurance companies).
240. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 ("[T]he terms 'estate' and 'property' shall include
insurance policies, retirement benefits exclusive of federal social security benefits,
annuities, pension plans, deferred compensation arrangements, and employee benefit
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the surviving spouse's elective share with life insurance. 24 1  This
Article calls on North Carolina to join its northern neighbor and
enact comprehensive legislation designed to protect surviving spouses
from intentional disinheritance.
plans to the extent owned by, vested in, or subject to the control of the decedent on the
date of his death or the date of an irrevocable transfer by him during his lifetime").
241. See Felix-Aranibar v. Felix, No. W26889, 2002 WL 1941025, at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 12, 2002) (holding that life insurance benefits are included in Virginia's augmented
estate for the purpose of the surviving spouse's elective share).
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